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 This paper will examine how animal protection investigators, lobbyists and 
campaigners in Scotland consider the relationship between nature and ethics. 
Specifically, it will look at the complex ways in which activists deploy the categories 
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ in order to interpret realms of animal suffering and judge the 
actions of human and non-human agents in those fields. The paper is also 
concerned to chart the ways in which animal protection activists develop strategies 
for persuading various audiences of the rightness of their position; these include 
charity supporters and prospective donors, but also politicians and civil servants 
involved in the legislative process in the Scottish Parliament. More broadly, the paper 
engages with debates in the emergent fields of the anthropology of ethics and 
human-animal relations. It is interested in the relationship between ethics and 
appearance and in the distribution of agency in claims or judgments of ethical or 
unethical behaviour.  
 




 ‘There’s badness down there,’ Barry tells me as he lowers his 
binoculars and surveys the valley below us. I follow the direction of his gaze, 
which leads my eyes away from the exposed hills of the heather-bound moor 
around us, along the contours of a descending dry-stone wall and towards a 
small plantation of conifers. We set off, tramping once again through the long 
grass and trying to avoid the slope’s many rabbit holes. Barry explains that he 
has identified a number of suspicious disturbances in the tree line: areas 
which he thinks deserve further investigation. After climbing the wall and 
jumping the fence beyond it, we reach the plantation and crouch down. With 
his trekking pole, Barry starts to examine the foliage breaks, gentling parting 
the low-lying branches and bracken in the hope of uncovering animal tracks or 
signs of human entry. ‘Sometimes,’ he informs me, ‘the paths can lead you to 
badness. Sometimes I just smell it.’ And with that, he opens a gap between 
the fir trees and disappears into the thicket. 
 What Barry is looking for is snares: wire loops, about the size of a 
watermelon, that are widely laid by Scottish gamekeepers to trap predator 
species, in particular foxes, on grouse- and pheasant-shooting estates. Cheap 
and easy to deploy, the snare wire is simply anchored to a stationary object in 
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the vicinity, such as a tree or fence, and designed to tighten on contact. 
Snaring is a legal practice in Scotland, but Barry and the small animal 
protection charity he works for are campaigning to ban it on the grounds that it 
is a cruel and indiscriminate form of predator control. He is charged by the 
charity to monitor and record the legal and illegal use of snares, a form of 
evidence-gathering to assist the wider task of campaign lobbying. As Barry 
points out, his ‘fieldwork’ reveals that snares often do result in long, slow and 
painful animal deaths, and in the trapping of non-target species like deer and 
badgers. Indeed, this is the ‘badness’ of which he speaks and around which 
his investigations centre. He devotes time and energy to locating animal 
tracks in the woodland of shooting estates because these are gamekeepers’ 
favoured sites for laying snares. Likewise, when Barry claims he can ‘smell 
badness’, he means he has learnt to identify and use the scent of 
decomposition to find living or dead trapped animals.  
 For all members of this animal protection charity, snares are a glaringly 
human technology. They provide a simple but discrete example of the large-
scale exploitation and abuse of wild animals in the Scottish countryside and of 
the general indifference to their ordeal. Snares and the shooting estates they 
are found on are taken to embody the false assumption that humans are 
superior and exceptional beings with the right of domination over other living 
creatures. In this regard, the charity’s views conform to the broader critique of 
industrial humanity offered by the Euro-American animal rights movement. 
Snaring is but one more example of the cruel and prejudicial treatment of non-
human animals, a form of injustice that mirrors or even exceeds human 
cruelty to its own species (see Laidlaw 2010a: 67-68, Song 2010: 55-56). 
Crucially, as the parallel suggests, animals are figured as victims, 
philosophically equivalent to human subjects in their relative capacity to suffer 
and experience pain. Like animal rights organisations and other animal 
protection organisations (the distinction is hazy, but in general the former are 
more focused on the idea of animal liberation and protest, the latter on the 
idea of animal welfare and petitioning), the charity sees itself as an advocate 
for the reduction or abolition of that unnecessary suffering. This includes the 
ambition of challenging the tendency to consider animals as resources, fit for 
human ends.  
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 The reasoning and judgments of these charity workers, including 
Barry’s graphic identification of badness, makes clear that subjects believe 
they are operating in an explicitly ethical terrain. For them, the laying of 
snares is a breach of moral responsibility: it highlights a division between right 
and wrong acts, invites the attribution of blame and clarifies the virtue of their 
charitable work. Indeed, like other animal rights and animal protection 
agencies, members understand themselves to be involved in ‘ethical 
campaigning’. Collectively and individually they are concerned to cultivate an 
ethical career. Such an emphasis prompts this essay’s engagement with the 
recent ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology, centred round the concern to ‘theorise 
and document the centrality of ethics for human life’ (Lambek 2010: 5). In 
particular, I am interested in the suggestion that anthropological attention 
should fall not just on ethical self-fashioning (Foucault 1990; & see Faubion 
2011), but also upon the ethical as a dimension or modality of practice and 
action (Lambek 2010: 10, & see Laidlaw 2010b, 2013). As Lambek points out, 
in common use the term ‘ethical’ has a double meaning – it can refer to the 
positive value placed on specific kinds of acts and to the general field in which 
criteria are laid out and judgment of action exercised (2010: 9). Charity 
workers deploy both usages. But, as I explore, ethics is not a sufficient 
ethnographic category to articulate the rightness or wrongness of an action 
such as snaring. At least for the animal protection charity I worked with, 
another mediating category is required. 
 As Haraway (1991: 1) once highlighted and the contributors to this 
issue continue to demonstrate, the construction or deployment of nature is at 
the heart of Euro-American debates about how one should live, ‘perhaps the 
most central arena of hope, oppression, and contestation… in our times’. Its 
definition or redefinition continues to allow subjects, among them the workers 
of the animal protection charity I know, to differentiate their position, animate 
claims to good or bad behaviour and ‘refigure the kinds of persons we might 
be’ (1991: 3). This is so despite the fact that nature at times appears ‘de-
traditionalised’ (Franklin 2000: 190; & see Strathern 1992), in danger of losing 
its axiomatic moral status in the face of new technologies and knowledge. 
Indeed, for Barry and his colleagues at the animal protection charity, ethics 
and nature are vitally intertwined. The latter gives form to their notion of moral 
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authority and the former provides a language by which human relations to 
non-human animals can be described. The critiques provided by some of the 
category’s closest observers (see Haraway 2003, 2008, Latour 2004), which 
point out the ways in which nature can deny or obscure precisely the kinds of 
human-animal attachments whose acknowledgement might offer an 
alternative moral basis for relating, may challenge that link but for the charity 
workers, nature continues to nuance the twists, turns, and risks of their ethical 
lives. Furthermore, the concept is vital to ethical reasoning. This includes the 
confirmation of animal rights, but also the suggestion that their ethical 
awareness might exceed that argument. In all these convolutions, the essay 
remains firmly focused on the importance for charity workers of the orienting 
figure of the snare and its accompanying actions, the practice of snaring and 
the experience of being snared. 
 
 
The (Un)natural World 
 For Barry, the implications of snaring are both direct and personal. 
Indeed, as the charity’s field investigator, he is the only one who confronts 
snares in situ. These traps, he tells me, are not just human interventions in 
the Scottish rural environment, they are indicative of what he holds to be a 
completely denatured national landscape, precisely crafted for the purpose of 
killing. The moor and narrow valleys we tramp across, he points out, take their 
form from the requirements of the grouse shoot. So, estate managers plant 
woodland or lease out land for conifer plantations to encourage predators 
such as foxes to live and breed there and hence make trapping and control 
more efficient. They keep the heather and other foliage on the moors 
distinctively low through regular burnings in order to force new growth for the 
grouse birds to feed on and to ensure wide, clear-view spaces for the sport of 
shooting parties. As Barry elaborates, the more iconically wild and remote 
parts of Scotland also tend to be estate-run. If not designed for grouse or 
pheasant shooting, they operate to facilitate highly economic activities such 
as deer stalking or fly-fishing. If one includes the vast tracts of farmland, in 
Barry’s eyes organised for the industrial rearing and slaughter of animals 
arbitrarily designated as livestock, then agrarian Scotland is not just the 
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context for acts of human cruelty to non-human animals, it is itself part of that 
technology. Badness is literally everywhere. In fact Barry complains that his 
investigations leave him unable to enjoy the countryside. For he can’t help 
seeing the sinister human motivations behind the aspects that others take as 
innocent rural or wild scenes.  
 And yet nature does intrude. Snares may be a human technology but, 
as already noted, they tend to be laid along the paths of non-human animal 
tracks. Barry (and the gamekeepers who lay them) knows that snares are only 
effective if they are set in the right place, with an appropriate knowledge of 
predator behaviour. In this regard, one might speak of snaring as a practice 
that requires both wire loop and animal track to work together; it is only in 
tandem that they form a successful trap. So it is possible to identify what 
Barry regards as a ‘natural’ topographical feature at play here, and not just a 
vision of a hyper-cultured, denatured environment. Actually Barry 
automatically considers the animal tracks he discovers on shooting estates as 
an effect of the regular movements of predator and non-predator species over 
time whose actions he also identifies as a series of ‘natural’ behaviours. While 
the laying of the snare by the keeper is a cruel and ‘unnatural’ act, Barry 
assumes that the predations of the fox are within but at the same time outside 
the bad, interventionist environment of the estate. 
 Such acts of identification are conventional to all members of the 
animal protection charity. Concretely, the work of carefully and consistently 
differentiating between the natural and the unnatural animates much of what 
the organisation does and how its staff individually feels about the 
relationships between humans, their traps and non-human animals. The 
opposition provides the premise for campaign actions and the target for 
political lobbying. It defines the basis for critiques of human action as 
unethical and for explaining the differences between certain kinds of animal 
behaviour. Far more pervasive than the perhaps more studied and regularly 
highlighted dichotomy between nature and culture, this separation is crucial. 
Charity workers then still regularly deploy the concept of nature but in a way 
that suggests the field outside it is a purely negative space. Indeed, I want to 
suggest that in this rendering the realm of the denatured or unnatural carries a 
quite distinct trajectory from the realm of the cultural.  
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 As Eilidh, the charity’s chief executive told me, ‘natural acts are ones in 
which one has no choice.’ They are instinctive kinds of behaviour and in the 
case of non-human animals vitally linked to the ‘fight for survival’. So the fox 
hunts and kills the grouse because it needs to eat. One cannot, she states, 
say the same for the gamekeeper who lays his trap or the shooting parties 
who aim to bag a brace. Although both actions may involve the prey animal 
experiencing equivalent levels of pain and suffering, there is no deliberate 
cruelty or badness behind the former killing. Eilidh explains, ‘the fox does not 
intend the grouse or pheasant to suffer, it just intends to survive.’ Once again 
the distinction drawn is with the calculating, considered and hence unnatural 
motivations of the human actor. As Song (2010: 39) points out, the concept of 
‘killing for fun’ is a key differentiator of human action in much animal rights 
discourse. Outrage at organised shoots, for instance, is often articulated 
through a critique of non-utilitarian slaughter. This charge is certainly picked 
up by the animal protection workers I knew, who also decry grouse and 
pheasant shoots on that basis. Although the clear instrumental purpose of 
snaring, in the economic management of an estate, means it does not quite fit 
the accusation of killing for killing’s sake, it remains unnatural and wrong 
because it too detaches action from genuine needs. 
 More broadly, the identification of natural and unnatural acts is a 
discussion or reflection on relative culpability. As Laidlaw (2010b: 153, 2013) 
outlines, assignments of responsibility are central to the definition of an ethical 
field and the ‘constitution and extension of the self’. Such attributions may 
include the revelation of hidden motivators, such as intention or temper 
(2010b: 157). They may locate accountability with the perpetrator, but equally 
show that ‘agency has sources other than those “inside” the individual’ 
(2010b: 152). Laidlaw highlights, for instance, the complex attributions at play 
in the various defences of ‘involuntariness’. In this context, the natural seems 
to operate as a wholesale form of mitigation or to preclude the necessity of 
mitigation altogether, it describes an involuntary non-human actor who acts 
out of need and hence escapes any kind of responsibility for actions. Eilidh 
and the other charity workers would state that there is no malice or pleasure 
in the actions of the fox hunting the grouse, or at least if there is, the only 
determining factor is the fight for life. By contrast, the unnatural seems to draw 
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judgment and accountability toward it. The human actor described is 
constitutionally wilful or an intermediary for the wilfulness and choices of 
another. Charity workers would hold the grouse shooter who kills for fun 
morally responsible for his or her actions, which are taken to reveal intention 
and state of mind. They may also hold the gamekeeper individually culpable 
for laying snares, though in this case determining agency and hence primary 
blame may be assigned to the keeper’s employers. It may even be attributed 
to the whole animal-industrial complex that makes shooting and the wider 
exploitation of non-human animals possible.  
 Indeed, it is not just the fact that gamekeepers and estate managers 
have the choice not to snare wild creatures that makes their actions unnatural 
and immoral. For Eilidh it is also a question of ‘scale’ – as she admits, 
‘nature’s cruel in some ways, and you will find examples of it through all 
animals. But again humans somehow have just blown it out of all proportion.’ 
The fox, then, may kill and eat many birds over time, but each killing is an 
individual act between predator and prey in a natural environment. By 
contrast, the gamekeeper inflicts multiple injuries and deaths simultaneously. 
Not only does he lay tens or hundreds of snares across the estate, he is also 
absent at the moment animals are trapped and often at the moment they are 
killed. As Eilidh concludes, ‘I feel it is only because we are detached that we 
are able to do it on that elevated scale.’ Snaring then is wrong partly because 
humans themselves have found a way to avoid the constraints of the natural 
order. ‘I would say we are part of nature,’ Eilidh muses, ‘but I think society is 
becoming more and more denatured. I think it’s inevitable that we become 
less close to nature.’ So it would seem that humans in some senses are or 
soon will be constitutionally unnatural.  
 This creates some confusion, especially when charity workers move 
from identifying the human abuses and exploitation of non-human animals to 
trying to distinguish what might make some human actions natural. ‘Family 
units, I would say, mother and baby,’ one staff member responded when I 
asked, ‘yeah that would be the most natural.’ But even as she thus 
speculated, the woman questioned her own designation: ‘You find that a lot of 
people don’t have a natural instinct to be with their own kind, and I would say 
that’s quite rare in the animal world, unless there is something wrong with the 
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creature.’ As self-consciously liberal secularists, the animal protection charity 
workers are more confident in their designation of actions or attitudes they 
regard as conservative or reactionary. Thus the death penalty is easily 
rejected on the basis that it is a state-planned, premeditated and hence 
‘unnatural’ form of killing. And same sex partnerships are actively embraced 
as perfectly ‘natural’ relationships, on the grounds that individuals do not 
choose their sexual orientation. Although it is rare for them to describe non-
human animal actions as unnatural, there are notable exceptions, almost 
always connected with what they regard as human interventions. Zoo animals 
display unnatural behaviour because they are placed in an unnatural 
environment; likewise fighting dogs or pedigree pets, whose unnatural 
behaviours or postures have been reared or ‘inbred’ in them by generations of 
human owners.  
 Of course the wider dilemma circulates around the issue of ethics itself. 
In imagining humans as detached from nature, charity workers may at times 
deploy the category as an ethical concept or talk as though the natural and 
the moral are conjoined categories. But they are insistent that non-human 
animals are not proper subjects for ethical judgment. As already suggested, 
the fox may act naturally in killing a grouse, but it is not acting in a moral 
domain, at least in a manner that means it can be held to account. Indeed, 
here the natural, linked to the notion of instinct and the principle of endurance, 
seems to actively exclude the ethical. Only human beings, the potentially 
unnatural and hence morally dubious animal, can choose to behave well or 
badly. On the face of it, this is a position that seems to reinforce the 
denaturing of the world that animal protectionists bemoan, to confirm the 
inevitable separation of humans from non-human animals.  
 
 
Animal Protection Versus Environmentalism 
 
Evidence on the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Bill: Stage 
1  
Elaine Murray (Dumfries) (Lab): Okay. We move to snaring, which is 
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probably even more contentious. We had conflicting views about the need to 
use snares when we visited the Langholm moor demonstration project last 
week. Simon Lester, the head gamekeeper, told us that in some cases there 
was no alternative… Obviously, that is not the view of groups such as… [the 
animal protection charity I worked with are here named]. What are the views 
of LINK members on snaring? Do any of your members use snaring? Do you 
believe that it is necessary, particularly for successful grouse shooting or 
game management? What are your views generally on the argument that 
snaring is an indiscriminate trap? ... 
Lloyd Austin (Scottish Environment LINK): Rather like the previous 
question, this is an area that is very much dominated by animal welfare 
issues, which are not an area of our expertise, which is much more in 
conservation and population management issues. That is why, collectively, 
LINK has not done any work on snaring. I will ask the panel members who 
represent organisations that are land managers to comment. 
Mike Daniels (Scottish Environment LINK): The John Muir Trust does not 
generally do predator control, and we certainly do not snare… Our main 
reasons for not snaring are… that we are concerned about the indiscriminate 
nature of bycatch, with otters, pine martens, wildcats and other species 
getting caught in snares. As Lloyd Austin has indicated, we do not really take 
a position on the welfare side, although we are obviously aware of concerns 
from some of our members about welfare issues in relation to snaring. 
 
 The extract above is a section of the verbatim transcript from a 
consultation stage hearing of the Rural Affairs & Environment Committee of 
the Scottish Parliament. Witnesses from ‘stakeholder’ organisations have 
been invited to respond to Committee members’ questions as part of the 
process of scrutiny into the Wildlife and Natural Environment Bill. This is 
everyday business for the animal protection charity I worked with; the 
organisation prides itself on its reputation as a respected animal welfare 
lobbyist that is regularly asked by both government and parliamentary 
committees to submit evidence. This Bill in particular drew their interest 
because it was the first piece of primary legislation in many years to directly 
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address issues of wildlife and countryside management, and to include 
specific clauses on the practice of snaring. However, although the charity is 
named in the extract above, the conversation recorded is actually between a 
Member of Scottish Parliament (MSP) and a number of witnesses from an 
umbrella group of Scottish environment or conservation bodies. I choose to 
quote it because I think it illustrates another dimension of the animal 
protection perspective, one that helps further draw out the ways in which 
ethics and nature and the opposition between the natural and the unnatural 
play out for them.  
 Indeed, my attendance at these parliamentary committee hearings and 
my close involvement with the lobbying work of the charity on snaring 
revealed an aspect of animal protection that, at least to me, was entirely 
unexpected. During fieldwork, I was struck by the realisation that the charity 
figured itself not just in opposition to the interests of what they would see as 
obvious agencies of badness or animal cruelty such as industrial farming and 
shooting estates, but also through a complex alliance and tension with 
environmentalist outlooks. In fact, at times, that latter distinction appeared 
more crucial to their self-definition as ethical campaigners; members of the 
charity would regularly point out to me the ways in which for them an animal 
welfare or protection position contrasted with and overrode the priorities of 
conservation (although at the time unknown to me, I subsequently learnt that 
this tension has garnered some recent commentary [see Bekoff 2013]). The 
emphasis jars partly because, as charity workers themselves admit, the 
general public fails to see the division; an assumption exists that supporters of 
animal welfare will also be supporters of environmentalism. It further surprises 
because at one level both perspectives share a remarkably similar ethical 
stance on human action (see Laidlaw 2010a), which for the purposes of 
critique is usually figured as behaviour disconnected from nature and 
damaging to natural order. 
As the extract above highlights, this tension is also something that 
clearly works in reverse. When the MSP asked the umbrella group delegates 
for their opinions on snares, they immediately prefaced any comments with 
the bracketing observation that this is a substantively ‘animal welfare issue’ 
and hence outside their sphere of expertise. The second witness goes so far 
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as to say, ‘we do not really take a position on the welfare side’. To me, such 
responses seemed very odd, especially given the fact that the conservation 
groups they represented were themselves Scottish landowners and managers 
who had taken a deliberate decision not to lay snares on their estates. 
Certainly, for Maggie, the policy director of the animal protection charity I work 
with, these replies and the general failure of the conservation groups to 
outright condemn snaring or comment on the treatment of trapped animals is 
a source of constant frustration. While her witness testimony to the Committee 
also mentioned problems identified by the conservation bodies, such as the 
indiscriminate nature of the trap, it was roundly focused on the submission of 
evidence demonstrating the manner in which snared creatures feel pain and 
injury. ‘The cost in animal suffering is so high,’ Maggie told them, ‘that I would 
like the Committee to consider what is acceptable and what we should 
legislate for.’ Time and again, it is on this basis that she makes her appeal.  
The stress is important because it highlights what for Maggie and the 
other charity members is the crux of the difference between animal protection 
and conservation. In appealing to animal suffering, she is placing primacy 
firmly on the life and experience of individual living creatures, their right to be 
treated with respect and not be subject to human acts of cruelty. This should 
be the starting point, Maggie invites, for any legislative action. Behind that 
assertion is a general assumption that the natural world is a place precisely 
animated by these individual lives, a fact that for charity workers provides the 
basis of moral equivalence between human and non-human animals. In its 
individuality, then, humanity can be refigured as part of nature. What we 
naturally share with foxes and grouse is ‘sentience’, ‘personality’ and ‘feeling’, 
an awareness of a world around us and a capacity to both negatively and 
positively experience and respond to it.   
As several charity members emphasised, this is patently not the 
perspective of environmentalism. ‘Well fundamentally I suppose,’ Maggie told 
me, ‘the difference is that our priority is the welfare of individual animals, 
whereas a conservation organisation, their priority is numbers of animals and 
populations.’ In this latter view, the natural world is a place animated by 
species and by particular ecosystems that need protection. Typically, focus 
lies on species survival, ‘carrying capacity’ of environments and the need to 
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find ‘balance’ (see Berglund 1998). The stress placed on species inter-
dependency means that individual creatures are ultimately subsumed by 
genus and that no species, at least in its contribution to sustaining habitat, 
should get left out of the environmentalist’s moral concern. By contrast, the 
accent placed on consciousness in animal protection, as in animal rights (see 
Song 2010: 133, Rigby 2011: 87), allows for the proposition of abstract scales 
of natural comparison between individuals within and across species and 
between species types. It also enables their respective ranking. Plants, for 
instance, are typically excluded from the moral care of the charity workers I 
knew, and debates rage among them about the relative worth of insects and 
other consciousness-low or lacking creatures. Although the animal protection 
charity and conservation groups sometimes find bases for cooperation in 
lobbying work and usually collectively figure themselves against commercial 
interests in land management, who they depict as neither concerned with the 
welfare of individual animals nor with the protection of animal populations, the 
relationship ultimately always breaks down along that fault line (none of these 
actors publicly evoked ‘Compassionate Conservation’ or other recent attempts 
to resolve the tension between animal protection and environmentalism [see 
Bekoff 2013]). This does not mean that charity members don’t deploy 
categories of population and sometimes of inter-species relations or that 
conservationists don’t sometimes dwell on the characteristics of an individual 
animal, but it does mean that they both equally struggle to communicate 
formal ethical positions from these alternative levels or points of engagement 
with what they both take to be the natural world.  
The contrast may be drawn out another way if we look at one recent 
attempt to bridge the gap between animal rights and environmentalist ethics. I 
am thinking of the rearticulated theory and practice of responsibility put 
forward by Haraway (2003, 2008).  She wishes to maintain the notion that 
particular animals deserve regard at the level of individual and kind (genus or 
species), however at the same time challenge the assumption that these units 
of being are the proper measure of ethical concern. For her, ‘mattering’ 
always exists inside specific relationships (2008: 70). This includes 
connections between individual human and non-human animals and between 
humanity and other species. The point is not just that this focus better reflects 
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Haraway’s re-envisioning of nature as ‘entangled assemblages of relatings 
knotted at many scales and times’ (2008: 88). It is also that it offers a means 
to refigure the criteria and terms of ethical care. Seen from this perspective, 
she proposes, non-human animals are not straightforwardly victims and 
humans are not the only significant agents in a moral realm. Indeed, Haraway 
holds that an acknowledgment that what matters takes place inside tangible 
connections crucially allows one to consider particular human and animal 
actors as co-respondents (2008: 71). They may not be equal or symmetrical 
partners, but they are conjoined. Here, ‘responsibility is a relationship crafted 
in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being’ 
(ibid). It is not or cannot just be a unidirectional obligation upon the human; 
Haraway makes clear that key drivers of animal protection and animal rights, 
such as the minimisation or relief of animal suffering, are not in her schema 
sufficiently responsible. If one insisted on maintaining the language of rights, 
she observes (2003: 53), then these would not be rights that existed a priori or 
preformed, attached to the natural state of individual or species being, but 
rights that emerged over time and in specific relational contexts; for instance, 
the mutual rights of respect and attention that cat and human owner may 
establish in each other.  
Although Haraway’s idea of responsibility as a phenomenon of specific 
relations and not just of human agency in many ways serves as a critique of 
the animal protection position (and that of classic environmentalism), I believe 
that there are elements of her argument that might appeal to members of the 
charity. Most strikingly, the presentation of human-animal relations as 
particular, historically inter-subjective and mutually responsive chimes with the 
way many of them narrate their own relationships with specific pets or 
companion animals. Individuals explicitly and implicitly nod to this co-
presence in their lives and regularly contrast the quality of that interaction with 
the more conventional relationships of pet ‘ownership’ that they perceive in 
Britain. But the sympathy for Haraway would completely break down at the 
point she tries to introduce other kinds of human-non-human animal 
interactions into the sphere of responsibility or moral concern. Notably, charity 
workers would outright reject the suggestion that instrumental kinds of 
relationship, for instance in farming or animal testing, might also be rendered 
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as co-responsive or intra-active. The insistence that human induced animal 
suffering cannot be contained within the category ethical or the realm of 
natural or responsible actions ultimately restricts which connections matter, a 
fact that also reinforces the division with environmentalism.  
 For members of the animal protection charity, the obvious illustration of 
this opposition is the act of culling. As the quoted evidence of the 
parliamentary committee witnesses makes clear, the outstanding 
‘conservation issue’ around snaring is the problem of ‘bycatch’: the fact that 
these wire loops can trap non-target and endangered Scottish species such 
as capercaillies, pine martens or otters. Formally, then, conservationists have 
nothing to say about how the target species is trapped or killed. In fact, while 
they don’t use snares on their estates, they do carry out predator control. 
Such culls are performed in the name of environmental rebalance or favoured 
species protection. Conservation groups, then, will consider and do support 
the killing of individual non-human animals in the interests of what they view 
as the bigger picture of ‘population management’. This is something the 
animal protection charity would never endorse. In fact, they actively campaign 
against it. Their argument is not just that the individual life of the animal must 
come first, but that the whole notion of humans acting to sustain the 
environment is misplaced and wrong thinking. Once again, the issue falls on 
what is natural and whether humans have the right to interfere in the struggles 
between non-human animal actors.  
 Indeed, charity workers hold the idea that humans can manage non-
human animal populations and thus keep the natural world in balance as 
absurd, part of the very problem they are trying to combat (and an example of 
why instrumental relations cannot enter the sphere of responsibility). The 
following view, provided by another member of the charity team, is indicative 
of the critique of conservation action, including culling, that they offer: 
 
I would argue, that the ecosystem they [i.e. environmentalists] are trying to 
preserve is human defined. Sadly, the wildlife in Scotland and our countryside 
is not natural in any way. It has been manmade, constructed. If we left it truly 
to nature it wouldn’t look anything like it does. So when they go in there and 
they say they are conserving the countryside, they are preserving their 
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version of their countryside, for their own reasons. They are not conserving 
one species over another because that is what nature intended, it’s because 
that’s what they would rather see. 
 
As the quote suggests, the contrast with environmentalism almost seems to 
licence a view of nature and the natural as ideology. Members of the animal 
protection organisation are highly sceptical of any claims made to act in 
defence of nature; or rather, they remain fixed on the practical consequences 
of those claims for individual animals. This does not lead them to propose a 
total lack of faith, but rather to favour a libertarian solution that opposes the 
notion of management altogether and imagines that nature should truly be 
allowed to determine its own outcomes. In response to my query about when 
human intervention in the countryside might be acceptable, the same staff 
member concluded, ‘If I saw it happening and it wasn’t something natural then 
yeah I would want to do something. But if it’s part of nature I would think, 
leave nature alone. You know who am I to intervene?’ This active abstention 
from unnatural intervention means letting the fox kill the capercaillie or pine 
marten. It means notionally allowing extinctions to occur. From this 
perspective, there is no redemption in human action, no possibility of a 
deliberative reintegration with nature. Rather animal protection seems to 





 But this is not the whole story. Although charity workers don’t regard 
humans as redeemable or morally responsible subjects in their instrumental 
management or care of environment and animal populations, they do identify 
a basis for renewal. For them, abstentionism or active non-intervention in the 
natural world, which includes refraining from causing animal suffering, is a 
necessary though not sufficient step. Animal protection should also be about 
self-awakening, the discovery or recognition of natural feeling within oneself. 
As one would expect, this ‘form of subjectivation’ (Foucault 1990) inevitably 
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connects to the way human subjects interact with their non-human animal 
contemporaries.  
 In addition to submitting evidence and witness testimony to the Rural 
Affairs & Environment Committee of the Scottish Parliament, the animal 
protection charity sought to influence the passage of the Bill in other ways. 
Like the lobbyists from the shooting estates and conservation bodies, Maggie 
devoted much time to seeking out and attending one-on-one interviews with 
the relevant government ministers, civil servants, MSPs and political party 
spokepersons on animal welfare or wildlife and countryside management 
issues. As well as providing scientific support for the charity’s claims about the 
levels of suffering among trapped animals, she always showed these 
individuals photographic images and video footage, usually taken by the 
investigations officer, of creatures caught in snares. Indeed, she viewed this 
task as a crucial part of the work of lobbying. Maggie wanted to make sure 
that everyone involved in the drafting and redrafting of the Bill saw how cruel 
snaring could be and hence what their ethical responsibilities were. While she 
knew this kind of submission did not count as proper ‘evidence’ in the 
estimations of ministers, committee members or civil servants, she persisted 
with it because she believed the images might distress them enough to prick 
their consciences and change their minds. How could anyone continue to 
support the use of snares after seeing what they did to individual animals? 
This, then, was an unabashed appeal to human feeling and to what Maggie 
and her colleagues at the charity termed as ‘empathy’.  
 The category is crucial to an understanding of how redemption and 
reintegration with nature might be conceived. For charity workers, empathy or 
the power to imaginatively experience the feelings of another is a key human 
instinctive capacity, vital to the development of an ethical life. This includes 
the ability to feel non-human animal joy and suffering. As one staff member 
told me, ‘when every child is born they have a connection with animals.’ The 
tragedy is that as the child grows into society he or she is taught to lose that 
connection and instead develop sets of unnatural reactions that result in 
detachment, animal cruelty and exploitation. Drawing on literature in child 
protection (see Myers Jr. 2013), an area at least one member of staff had 
previously worked in, the charity claims that the withdrawal of this empathy 
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and sympathetic relationship to animals also explains cruelty and abuse 
between humans. There is a strong sense, then, of an ethical sensibility lost 
but still latent within us that if recovered might radically reconstitute not just 
human-animal relations, but also relations between people. In showing the 
images of trapped creatures Maggie is therefore simply aiming to revive a 
basic humanity, to enable subjects to reconnect.  
 Such a strategy was based in sound experience from another domain 
of the charity’s work, the field of public campaigning. Like many animal rights 
organisations (see Song 2010), it had found that the display or publication of 
images of animal cruelty was a highly successful way of engaging supporters 
in particular issues and persuading them to ‘take action’. In the case of the 
‘Ban Snaring’ campaign, photographs and footage of foxes or badgers caught 
and struggling in snares or of the sometimes horrific injuries that killed them 
were crucial components that led individuals to sign petitions, fill out the 
template and send a letter to local MSPs or donate money. The images were 
regularly used in public talks and debates, school visits and on election 
hustings. Maggie also displayed them at stall presentations during the annual 
conferences of the main political parties, using the images to target ordinary 
delegates as much as the elected representatives. Indeed, at conference 
fringe meetings organised to discuss snaring, she regularly chose to illustrate 
her talk with a slideshow of animal suffering. Video footage of injured, 
distressed or dead trapped creatures often played on a continuous loop 
throughout the Q&A sessions that followed, provoking supportive but notably 
passionate, angry or tearful contributions from the floor. Before leaving such 
events, many of those present committed themselves to campaign for a ban 
on snaring, to lobby their parliamentary and local authority representatives 
and other branch party members.  
 To Maggie, the response of the delegates at these fringe meeting was 
not unexpected. There seems an assumption that snares, or at least images 
of animals trapped in snares, have the power to radically impact an audience 
and motivate grassroots dissent. Like other members of the animal protection 
charity, she views the public reaction as entirely ‘natural.’ Indeed, she 
believes that these images work precisely because they draw out ‘innate 
connections’. Snares, then, may act as instruments of predator control and 
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animal suffering, but once reproduced and displayed in campaign literature 
and media, they can also become a kind of empathy-making machine, 
eliciting or trapping human feeling for the snared creatures.  
 This idea of an ethics that needs to be aggressively sparked or 
reignited through mediated encounters with suffering is essential. It informs 
not just the way Maggie and other charity workers figure the power of images 
to instil empathy (or snare an audience), but also their broader sense of how 
human subjects come to ethical awareness. Individuals, for instance, 
consistently told me that they first developed a sense of their own moral 
obligations to non-human animals through encounters or personal 
experiences with particular creatures. Accounts of these relationships, often 
begun in childhood, remain crucial for them, to the extent that they tend to 
subsume the formal giving of reasons or moral logic such as the language of 
rights. In fact, it was this original feeling or experience of empathy with an 
animal, usually a household pet, that usually led them to later seek out and 
discover the literature on animal cruelty and animal rights and to involve 
themselves in campaigning. The chronology is important because it explains 
charity members’ attitude to abstract moral reasoning and deployment of 
scientific evidence. While staff regularly make use of both—the latter in part 
because it is the required form of legislative lobbying—and regard them as 
valuable, they are ultimately treated as secondary means of persuasion and 
after-the-fact confirmatory methods for reaching an ethical stance. For charity 
workers claim that they already instinctively know that animals are sentient, 
just as they already know through their own encounters that individual non-
human creatures can possess distinctive personalities. As a natural or innate 
kind of human knowing, such a basis for morality is, they hold, vitally 
democratic. The animal protection charity believes that empathy can be 
potentially reawakened in everyone, humanity retrospectively revealed as 




 To me, the notion of the charity workers seems to chime with an idea of 
ethics as ‘disruptive event’ (Smith 2011: 33-34; & see Levinas 2003), an 
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occurrence that dramatically interrupts commonplace and self-oriented 
interests. As Smith highlights, such a happening may be understood as 
motivated and delivered through direct or mediated experience of a singularity 
that is not one’s own and which thus forces recognition of responsibility; 
although the encounter is with an individual being, it seems to call forth a 
wider concern, for like beings in equivalent situations (such as all creatures 
trapped in snares). Indeed, Smith postulates that this kind of ‘fellow feeling’ 
(2011: 27), invoked and re-invoked by attention and response to the 
appearance of another, is perhaps a more accurate reflection of how ethical 
obligation and evaluation grows.  
This may be so, but that attention to the fellow feeling sparked by 
appearances, including images of snared creatures, does not however lead 
charity workers to consciously challenge or redefine their vision of nature. 
Unlike Smith (2011: 38), they do not suggest that one might begin to consider 
it as a dynamic process of manifestation, ‘the continual unfolding of existence 
into the phenomenal world of appearances’. Equally, they do not seek to 
critique the treatment of nature as a ‘premature assemblage’ (Latour 2004) or 
to re-narrate the human within the natural through a focus on relatings 
(Haraway 2008). For them, nature is still self-evidently nature, and remains 
valued as a whole ethically. This is so despite the fact that they offer stringent 
critiques of the ways others construct nature; they are quite prepared, for 
instance, to reveal its ideological foundation in the hands of conservationists. 
Although environments may be denatured and our treatment of animals 
dominated by instrumental and unnatural acts (typified by the laying of 
snares), faith exists that natural feeling persists and, if human action allows, 




I would like to thank all the members of the animal protection charity that I 
work with, including past and current staff. My thanks to Katie Dow and 
Victoria Boydell for inviting me to contribute to this special volume. I am also 
grateful for the comments and feedback of the reviewers, and those provided 
informally by Eeva Berglund, Matei Candea, Robin Irvine, Annelise Riles, 
Shari Sabeti and Tom Yarrow. Versions of this paper were given in 
anthropology department seminars at Durham, Maynooth and St Andrews, 






Berglund, Eeva. 1998. Knowing Nature, Knowing Science: Ethnology of 
Environmental Activism. Cambridge: The White Horse Press. 
 
Bekoff, Marc [ed.]. 2013. Ignoring Nature No More: The Case for 
Compassionate Conservation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Faubion, James. 2011. An Anthropology of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1990. The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Hurley. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
 
Franklin, Sarah. 2000. ‘Life Itself: Global Nature and the Genetic Imaginary’. 
In Global Nature, Global Culture. [eds.] Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury, Jackie 
Stacey. London: Sage. 
 
--. 2007. Dolly Mixtures: the remaking of genealogy. Duke University Press: 
Durham. 
 
Haraway, Donna J. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: the reinvention of 
Nature. Routledge: New York. 
 
--. 2003. The Companion Species Manifesto: dogs, people, and significant 
otherness. Prickly Paradigm Press: Chicago. 
 
--. 2008. When Species Meet. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 
 
Laidlaw, James. 2010a. ‘Ethical Traditions in Question: Diaspora Jainism and 
the Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements’. In Ethical Life in South 
Asia [eds.] Anand Pandian & Daud Ali. Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 
61-80. 
 
--. 2010b. ‘‘Agency and Responsibility: perhaps you can have too much of a 
good thing.’ In Ordinary Ethics: anthropology, language and action. [ed.] 
Michael Lambek. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
--. 2013. The Subject of Virtue: an Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom (New 
Departures in Anthropology). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lambek, Michael. 2010. ‘Introduction’. In Ordinary Ethics: anthropology, 
language and action. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. 2003. Humanism of the Other. Urbana & Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 
 21 
Myers Jr., Olin Eugene. 2013. ‘Children, Animals, and Social Neuroscience: 
Empathy, Conservation Education, and Activism.’ In Ignoring Nature No More: 
the Case for Compassionate Conservation. [ed.] Marc Bekoff. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Rigby, Kate. 2011. ‘Getting a taste for the Bogong Moth’, Australian 
Humanities Review 50: 77-94. 
 
Smith, Mick. 2011. ‘Dis(appearance): Earth, Ethics and apparently 
(In)significant Others,’ Australian Humanities Review 50: 23-44. 
 
Strathern, Marilyn. 1992. After Nature: English kinship in the late twentieth 
century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Song, Hoon. 2010. Pigeon Trouble: bestiary biopolitics in a deindustrialised 
America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
 
